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Introduction
Computerised medical records (CMR) and computer-
ised physician order entry systems (CPOE) systems
are increasingly used in clinical practice.1 Information
and communication technology is changing society2
and supporting healthcare professionals3 by standard-
ising communication protocols.4 Such systems are
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their laboratory test results electronically. This
study reports a computerised physician order entry
(CPOE) system error in the pathology test request
date that went unnoticed in family practices.
Method We conducted a case study using a caus-
ation of risk theoretical framework; comprising
interviews with clinicians and the manufacturer to
explore the identiﬁcation of and reaction to the
error. The primary outcome was the evolution and
recognition of and response to the problem. The
secondary outcomewas to identify other issues with
this system noted by users.
Results The problem was deﬁned as the incorrect
logging of test dates ordered through a CPOE
system. The system assigned the test request date
to the results, hence a blood test taken after a
therapeutic intervention (e.g. an increase in chol-
esterol-lowering therapy)would appear in the com-
puterised medical record as though it had been
tested prior to the increase in treatment. This case
demonstrates that: the manufacturers failed to
understand family physician workﬂow; regulation
of medical software did not prevent the error; and
inherent user trust in technology exacerbated this
problem. It took three months before users in two
practices independently noted the date errors.
Conclusion This case illustrates how users take
software on trust and suppliers fail to make provi-
sion for risks associated with new software.
Resulting errors led to inappropriate prescribing,
follow-up, costs and risk. The evaluation of such
devices should include utilising risk management
processes (RMP) tominimise andmanage potential
risk.
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beneﬁcial for laboratorywork processes,5–7 improving
the eﬃciency of laboratories8 and healthcare deliv-
ery.3,9,10 However, there is limited data on patient
outcomes when using these applications, which may
be due to the potential for adverse events in clinical
practice.11
Strict regulation,12 validation and veriﬁcation pro-
cesses ensure that software is tailored to user require-
ments and ensure patient safety.13 Clinicians rely on
medical software to deliver information, however,
these devices are associated with inherent hazards
such as functional errors, being unreliable, user-un-
friendly or if the primary setting is unprepared to
accommodate the required working processes.14 Such
failures can negatively aﬀect working processes and
the decisions of healthcare providers, resulting in
harm for patients.13,15
Risk management processes (RMP) aim to reduce
error, and utilising these is the responsibility of both
users and service providers (Box 1).16–18 There should
be systems in place to facilitate communication and
action if errors arise. This is particularly relevant for
CPOE systems, as their introduction can have unex-
pected consequences requiring early detection and
action.19 Research to date highlights the need for
risk avoidance through the continual evaluation of
systems; ensuring optimal useability11 and intrinsic
safety that will persist, even in the hands of busy
clinicians.20
Case description
A CPOE pathology test-ordering system within UK
primary care enables better tracking of specimens and
results. This allows community based clinicians to
request tests and view patient results. Family doctor
users identiﬁed a problemwith this CPOE system; test
requests were logged as taken on the date of request,
instead of, as intended, on the date the sample was
taken. This was not recognised by all users, and may
have led to errors when interpreting these results. The
identiﬁcation of this problem has consequently been
evaluated, using a risk management framework to
identify potential sources of error from each stake-
holder group. This case study aims to raise awareness
of potential risk associated with medical software
devices used in clinical practice.
Method
Overview
We evaluated the application using a risk theory
framework.16–18 Data was collected through inter-
views with key stakeholders using the system. The
primary outcome was to explore the evolution and
recognition of and response to the problem. The
secondary outcome was to identify other issues with
this system as noted by users.
Literature review
We carried out a literature review using PubMed,
Medline and Web of Science. We searched using the
medical subject heading (MeSH)Medical Order Entry
Systems combined with either Safety management or
General Practice.
Timeline
The timeline begins with the installation of the
software, and then highlights the timespan between
recognition and reporting of the problem, and the
manufacturer’s response. All correspondence between
the manufacturer, aﬃliated CMR software providers,
the laboratory and users was recorded and included.
Data collection
Data was collected through face-to-face interviews
with primary care staﬀ (ﬁve general practitioners, a
Box 1 Risk theory application to software
implementations
Possible causes of failure
. Task perception: Failure of users and service
providers to realise responsibility; mistaken
priorities by developers.
. Capability and experience: Lack of appreci-
ation of the consequences of actions or appro-
priate training.
. Work environment: Information overload in
a diﬃcult work environment may make it
diﬃcult for users to identify problems with
the application.
. Mistake: Random slips may occur at any stage
of development or use.
. Motivation: The designersmay have had a lack
of incentive to produce a high-quality appli-
cation; the users may not feel motivated to
report and look out for problems/errors with
the medical devices they use.
. Actions of others: The failure to communicate
errors or problems between users/providers
could lead to on-going increased clinical risk
when using the application.
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practice nurse and practice manager) who identiﬁed
the problem. Telephone interviews with the manufac-
turer, CMR system vendor support team and the
pathology laboratory support team were conducted
to explore existing regulatory frameworks, user re-
quirements, and review responses to the user experi-
ence with this CPOE system.
Causation of the risk and risk
management
These ﬁndings were indexed and charted through use
of Chapman and Ward’s causation of risk theoretical
framework (Box 1).16–18 The framework provided a
formal structure for identifying the source, extent and
consequences of the error(s) and understanding how
the resultant risks were managed by the key stake-
holder groups involved. This application of the risk
framework provided a systematically derived insight
into the prevention of similar events in future practice.
Ethical considerations
This investigation meets the National Research Ethics
Service (NRES) criteria of a service evaluation (www.
nres.nhs.uk/applications/is-your-project-research/).
Results
Primary outcome
Problem deﬁnition
The software incorrectly logged the test date as though
the test had been done on the date it was requested,
rather than the date the sample was taken and the test
done. In primary care, tests are commonly requested
in advance. These results were inaccurately storedwith
dates corresponding to when they were requested;
creating discrepancies in the order of test results.
This created confusion and may have compromised
patient safety; particularly with regards to drug moni-
toring.
Examples of where interpretation diﬃculties could
have clinical implications are given below.
. A GP reduces a statin dose (a medicine that lowers
blood cholesterol) and prepares a laboratory chol-
esterol request form. A printout is issued and the
patient books to attend an outpatient appointment
in a month. The test result is ﬁled on the date the
request form was printed, before the statin dose was
reduced. This complicates interpretation of results
and leads to repeat testing and inadequate treat-
ment.
. With warfarin (an anticoagulant) dosing and inter-
national normalised ratio (INR) measurements of
clotting, day-to-day accurate results are needed to
titrate doses, therefore, errors in INR test dates may
have signiﬁcant clinical implications for patients on
warfarin.
In practice, the ﬁnal test request form should have
allowed the clinician to diﬀerentiate between a test to
be performed straight away and one to be carried out
later (Figure 1). However, when clinicians deferred
test dates, the software presumed that the test was
performed on the date of the request.
Timeline
After installation in October 2010, it took until
January 2011 for only two of the family practices using
the software to recognise this problem (Figure 2).
The initial response was to retrain the doctors, as
the practice managers considered that they were
responsible for incorrectly logging dates. It soon became
apparent that this was an inbuilt error. When users
reported this error to the manufacturer, the response
time was slow and inappropriate in relation to the risk
posed. The maufacturer initially oﬀered impractical
solutions, such as a change in software or parallel
recording of dates. After six months of emails and
telephone calls relating to this problem, the manufac-
turer ﬁnally oﬀered a solution.
Figure 1 Screenshot of initial test-ordering screen
Figure 2 Timeline
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Causation of the risk
Responses from the manufacturer of this application,
CMR system vendor, the pathology laboratory service
and practitioners recognising the problem suggest
that the focus of individual actors was on their domain
of responsibility only rather than minimising risk
across the system as a whole (Table 1).
Risk management
The discrepancy between themanufacturer and front-
line clinicians regarding the perceived risk may have
explained the delay in reaction time and initial dis-
missive approach from the manufacturer. A delay in
ﬁnding a solution resulted in months of inaccurate
dating of results with subsequent knock-on eﬀects on
clinical care.
Secondary outcomes
First, the family physicians interviewed considered the
interface to be ‘user-unfriendly’. Second, subsequent
to the diﬃculties with recording dates, a block was
introduced into the CPOE that prevented a second
request being made for the same test shortly after the
ﬁrst (Figure 3). In practice workﬂow, a family phys-
ician often sees a patient, adjusts therapy and requests
a pathology test just before the next time theymeet for
a review. However, the introduction of the block
during 2012 – presumably to prevent unnecessary
duplicate tests – means that either the patient has to
be seen an extra time or some workaround such as
issuing a paper request form (with the inherent
increased inherent risks of transcription or other
errors) has to be put in place. Although it appears to
be a check that can be overridden, the alert cannot be
cancelled.
Discussion
Principal ﬁndings
This case describes the incorrect logging of dates for
tests ordered through the CPOE system. It highlights
how users trusted the software and failed to identify
risks associated with incorrect test dates, and how
providers of this system failed to understand family
physician workﬂow. Regulation of medical software
does not appear to have prevented this type of error.
Implications of the ﬁndings/
implications for practice
This risk may have signiﬁcantly compromised patient
safety. Delays in correction meant that results con-
tinued to be logged incorrectly, increasing the chance
of adverse events from reviewing incorrectly dated
results. Because this error was not noted earlier during
product development or applied performance testing,
this raises questions of whether the software under-
went adequate user pilot testing ahead of general
release. There is as a result a need for improved quality
assurance of software ensuring accuracy and safety of
devices.
Although noted by two practices, the problem was
not obvious to other practices using the system;
implying either incorrect use of the system, or failure
to recognise the error. This is important because if the
other users were not aware of this problem, they may
be at greater risk of misinterpreting sample results.
Therefore, this case should assist in heightening clin-
ician’s suspicion of medical support tool accuracy
used in clinical decision making.
Furthermore, the impact of such errors may in-
clude: (1) unwarranted tests or therapies, (2) the risk
of physicians branding a patient non-adherent, (3) the
opportunity cost of correcting errors, (4) the ﬁnancial
costs of serious errors, and (5) the cost of addressing
the supposed error rather than the actual error, by
‘retraining users of the device’ prior to recognising the
inbuilt nature of the error.
Comparison with the literature
There are many calls for improved evaluation of
clinical support tools;4,13,21 incorporating usability
engineering principles into software design to help
identify interface problems that may lead to adverse
events.11 Heuristic evaluations of usability should take
place early in the process of designing CPOE systems6
and successful CPOE implementation requires a solid
understanding of the organisational, communication,Figure 3 Screenshot of refused second lipid proﬁle
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Table 1 Sources of risk ineﬃciency in the key stakeholder groups
Factors Family practice
users recognising
the problem
Pathology
laboratory
Computerised medical
record (CMR) system
vendor
Software manufacturer
Task
perception
(1) Failure to realise
responsibility
(2) Mistaken
priorities due to
diﬃculty using
system
‘overcomplicated’
and ‘user-
unfriendly’
Following
instructions
incorrectly
(1) Mistaken priorities
(2) Failure to realise
responsibility
‘it appears like it’s a
training issue or it
could be there is a fault
on the desktop or
perhaps the wording
should be made clearer’
‘... manufacturer, please
can this issue be looked
into urgently.’
Closed the case when
they transferred
problem to
manufacturer
(1) Mistaken priorities
(2) Failure to realise
responsibility
‘I think you are
probably best to contact
CMR system vendor
with regards to how
they handle sample
collection dates, they
are in a better position
to advise.’
When responsibility was
realised – the response:
‘The system is working
by design.’
‘This is both a known
and national issue.’
Then they oﬀered some
workarounds.
Capability
and
experience
Lack of training/
skills in identifying
risk and having an
index of suspicion
Lack of
training/skills
Jumping to conclusions (1) Jumping to
conclusions about the
nature of a situation
and the impact
(2) Lack of appreciation
of the consequences of
actions
Work
environment
Information
overload makes it
diﬃcult to identify
important
information
Inadequate work
environment –
increasing risk of
mistakes
Mistake Incorrect
assessment of
situation
(1) Incorrect assessment
of situation
(2) Failure to detect
problem
Motivation (1) Lack of
incentive for
high-level
performance
(2) Personal
objectives
Actions of
others
Failure to
communicate
information
Frustration of
others
Failure to communicate
information
Failure to communicate
information
If it was an inbuilt
problem – why were the
users not made aware of
this?
Incorrect components
supplied
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and temporal circumstances within which the system
will operate.22
Eﬀective decision-support systems cannot be assessed
purely by evaluating the usability and performance of
the software, the system testing needs to include cog-
nitive and socio-technical interactions.22 We need to
generate a deeper understanding of these issues to
design intrinsically ‘safe’ systems that minimise risk in
thehandsof clinicians,whoare oftenpoorly resourced.22
We should evaluate these types of applications in
practice.15,23,24 However, identiﬁed barriers to the
evaluation of such devices include: insuﬃciently avail-
able evaluation guidelines and support, inadequate
collaboration, cost and innate organisational resist-
ance.4,25 The barriers for clinicians includemotivation
and the complexity of the evaluation object.24
The emphasis on raising awareness among clin-
icians should be reinforced by suggesting that evalu-
ation of health informatics systems should have the
same role inmedical informatics as evidence and audit
have in clinical practice.15
Limitations
Thiswas a small case studymaking it hard to be certain
of generalisability. However, safety literature is often
based on reporting of critical incidents to help raise
awareness and inform others.
Call for further research
Further research is needed to reduce the margin for
error, raise awareness and ensure that products in use
meet user requirements. We recommend carrying out
on-site pilots with users in advance of general release,
and the promotion of widespread use of systematic
risk frameworks and RMPs such as Shape Harness and
Manage Project Uncertainties (SHAMPU)16 to formal-
ise risk management. Video is acceptable and a useful
media to observe workﬂow and can be combined with
other data gathering approaches.26 Video studies could
be used to capture current ways of working and the
impact and risk associated with the introduction of
new technologies on it.27
Conclusion
This case study describes how medical software
utilised for ordering online tests had an inbuilt design
error resulting in the incorrect logging of dates for test
results. This case study highlights how current systems
should consider making greater use of risks assess-
ment and management processes during the im-
plementation of a new software application.
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